

# Mechanics + HomeStreet

Introducing the premier West Coast community bank March 31, 2025









### **Disclaimer**

#### **Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements**

When used in this presentation and in other documents filed with or furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"), in press releases or other public shareholder communications, or in oral statements made with the approval of an authorized executive officer, the words or phrases "believes," "expects," "anticipates," "plans," "trend," "objective," "continue," or similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as "will," "would," "should," "could," "might," "may" or similar expressions are intended to identify "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date such statements are made. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements about the benefits of the business combination transaction involving Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet, Inc. ("HomeStreet") and HomeStreet Bank (the "Transaction"), including future financial and operating results, and the combined company's plans, objectives, expectations and intentions, and other statements that are not historical facts.

These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties, assumptions, estimates, and other important factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from those projected. In addition to factors previously disclosed in HomeStreet's reports filed with the SEC, the following factors, among others, could cause actual results to differ materially from forward-looking statements or historical performance: a) the occurrence of any event, change, or other circumstance that could give rise to the right of one or all of the parties to terminate the merger agreement to which Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet and HomeStreet Bank are parties; b) the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet or HomeStreet Bank; c) the possibility that the Transaction does not close when expected or at all because required regulatory, shareholder, or other approvals and other conditions to closing are not received or satisfied on a timely basis or at all (and the risk that such approvals may result in the imposition of conditions that could adversely affect the combined company or the expected benefits of the Transaction); d) the risk that the benefits from the Transaction may not be fully realized or may take longer to realize than expected, including as a result of changes in, or problems arising from, general economic and market conditions, interest and exchange rates, monetary policy, laws and regulations and their enforcement, and the degree of competition in the geographic and business areas in which Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet and HomeStreet Bank operate; e) changes in asset quality and credit risk; f) the inability to sustain revenue and earnings growth; g) customer borrowing, repayment, investment and deposit practices; h) customer disintermediation; i) the ability to promptly and effectively integrate the businesses of Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet Bank's customers, employees or other business partners, including those resulting from the announcement or completion of the

These factors are not necessarily all of the factors that could cause Mechanics Bank's, HomeStreet's, HomeStreet Bank's or the combined company's actual results, performance, or achievements to differ materially from those expressed in or implied by any of the forward-looking statements. Other factors, including unknown or unpredictable factors, also could significantly harm Mechanics Bank's, HomeStreet Bank's or the combined company's results.

Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet and HomeStreet Bank do not undertake or assume any obligation to update any of these statements to reflect actual results, new information or future events, changes in assumptions, or changes in other factors affecting forward-looking statements, except to the extent required by applicable law. If Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet or HomeStreet Bank update one or more forward-looking statements, no inference should be drawn that Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet or HomeStreet Bank will make additional updates with respect to those or other forward-looking statements. Further information regarding HomeStreet and HomeStreet Bank, and factors which could affect the forward-looking statements contained herein can be found in HomeStreet's filings with the SEC.



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This communication shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offering of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

#### Additional Information about the Transaction and Where to Find It

In connection with the Transaction, HomeStreet will file with the SEC a Registration Statement on Form S-4 to register the shares of HomeStreet (which will be renamed Mechanics Bancorp following the closing) capital stock to be issued in connection with the Transaction. The Registration Statement will include a consent solicitation statement of Mechanics Bank and a proxy statement of HomeStreet that also constitutes a prospectus. The definitive joint consent solicitation statement/proxy statement/prospectus will be sent to the shareholders of HomeStreet seeking their approval of the Transaction and other related matters and to shareholders of Mechanics Bank.

INVESTORS AND SECURITY HOLDERS ARE URGED TO READ THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 AND THE JOINT CONSENT SOLICITATION STATEMENT/PROXY STATEMENT/PROSPECTUS INCLUDED WITHIN THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-4 WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSACTION OR INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE CONSENT SOLICITATION STATEMENT/JOINT PROXY STATEMENT/PROSPECTUS, BECAUSE THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING HOMESTREET, HOMESTREET BANK, MECHANICS BANK, THE TRANSACTION AND RELATED MATTERS.

Investors and security holders may obtain free copies of these documents and other documents filed with the SEC by HomeStreet through the website maintained by the SEC at http://www.sec.gov or from HomeStreet at its website, https://ir.homestreet.com/sec-filings/all-filings/default.aspx. Documents filed with the SEC by HomeStreet will be available free of charge by accessing the "Investor Relations" page of HomeStreet's website at https://ir.homestreet.com/sec-filings/default.aspx.

#### Participants in the Solicitation

Mechanics Bank, HomeStreet and certain of their respective directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from HomeStreet's shareholders in connection with the Transaction. Information about the interests of the persons who may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of shareholders of HomeStreet in connection with the Transaction and a description of their direct and indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, will be included in the joint consent solicitation statement/proxy statement/prospectus related to the Transaction, which will be filed by HomeStreet with the SEC. Information about the directors and executive officers of HomeStreet, their ownership of HomeStreet common stock, and HomeStreet's transactions with related persons is set forth in the sections entitled "HomeStreet Corporate Governance and Other Matters," "2023 Executive Compensation Program," "2023 Summary Compensation Table" and "Principal Shareholders of HomeStreet" in the definitive proxy statement filed in connection with HomeStreet's meeting of shareholders held on June 18, 2024, as filed with the SEC on Schedule 14A on May 16, 2024 (and which is available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1518715/000155278124000348/e24254\_hmst-defm14a.htm). To the extent holdings of HomeStreet common stock by the directors and executive officers of HomeStreet have changed from the amounts held by such persons as reflected therein, such changes have been or will be reflected on Statements of Change in Ownership on Form 4 filed with the SEC. Free copies of these documents may be obtained as described above.







**Home**Street

## **Transaction summary**

HomeStreet Bank will merge with and into Mechanics HomeStreet will issue shares to Mechanics shareholders 1 Structure HomeStreet will remain a publicly traded bank holding company under a new name, Mechanics Bancorp Mechanics will be the accounting acquiror HomeStreet's balance sheet will be subject to fair value purchase accounting 100% stock-for-stock transaction Fixed exchange ratios where HomeStreet will issue Mechanics shareholders 212.5mm shares 2 Consideration Pro forma diluted shares: 231.7mm Ownership split: 91.7% Mechanics; 8.3% HomeStreet Holding company: Mechanics Bancorp 3 **Branding** Bank: Mechanics Bank Headquarters: Walnut Creek, California Executive Chairman: Carl Webb Chief Executive Officer: C.J. Johnson Leadership 9 Board members: 8 from Mechanics, 1 from HomeStreet Mark Mason retained as a consultant for two years Subject to approval from HomeStreet shareholders and Mechanics shareholders Mechanics shareholders with sufficient voting power to approve the transactions have entered into voting and support agreements to approve the transactions Customary regulatory approvals required: Federal Reserve, FDIC, California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation and 5 **Approvals** Washington State Department of Financial Institutions Anticipated closing 3Q'2025 Capital at close - Tier 1 leverage of 8.3%, CET1 of 12.4% and total risk-based capital of 14.4% CRE concentration at close of 390%; ex-multifamily 119% ~2.3x HomeStreet loan loss reserve at close (\$85mm). Pro forma company will have ~1% ACL / loans at close

Note: Projections per Mechanics management



# Combined company will be the leading community bank in attractive West Coast markets

1

#### SCARCITY VALUE IN ATTRACTIVE WEST COAST MARKETS

- √ \$23bn in pro forma assets
- √ 3<sup>rd</sup> largest West Coast and California midcap bank by deposits¹
- √ #3 rank in Seattle and #3 rank in San Francisco¹

2

#### TOP DECILE<sup>2</sup> PROFITABILITY

- ~18% '26E' and ~19% '27E' ROATCE
- ~1.4% '26E' and ~1.5% '27E' ROAA
- √ ~\$302mm '26E³ and ~\$325mm '27E³ earnings

3


#### **CORE FUNDED FRANCHISE**

- ✓ ~1.4% Q4'25E cost of deposits
- √ 100% core funded⁴ (paydown of 100% of FHLB and brokered deposits in connection with closing)
- ✓ Mark-to-market of HomeStreet's balance sheet

4

#### HIGHLY CAPITALIZED WITH STRONG CAPITAL RETURN

- ✓ 12.4% CET1 ratio at close (13.7% in 2027E)
- ✓ 14.4% Total capital ratio at close (15.7% in 2027E)
- √ 8.3% Tier 1 leverage at close (8.6% in 2027E)
- ✓ Plan to return excess capital as dividends



Note: Projections per Mechanics management; <sup>1</sup> Includes banks headquartered in California, Oregon, and Washington with less than \$250bn total assets; <sup>2</sup> Relative to West Coast banks, defined as BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK and WAFD; <sup>3</sup> Represents fully-synergized operating earnings per Mechanics' management; <sup>4</sup> Assumes funding base is adjusted for the repositioning of wholesale borrowings, brokered deposits and FHLB; pro forma company has no brokered deposits or FHLB; HomeStreet subordinated debt, senior debt and TruPs will remain part of the capital structure

# Compelling investment thesis deserving premium valuation




Other median ment had make median and Ford Financial Fund (740) summer

Strong alignment between public investors and Ford Financial Fund (74% owner)

Potential for a premium valuation – similar to banks that trade at high earnings multiples

Note: Projections per Mechanics management; <sup>1</sup> Includes banks headquartered in California, Oregon, and Washington with less than \$250bn total assets; <sup>2</sup> West Coast banks defined as BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK and WAFD







**Home**Street

# Ford Fund has 40+ years of experience with acquisitions



#### **Bank investors**

- \$1.8bn in commitments focused on community bank investments
- Fully invested in Mechanics
- Strong relationship with regulators

#### Track record

- The Ford Fund is considered among the nation's most experienced and successful investors and operators of community banks
- Ford is considered a bank holding company by the Federal Reserve and can therefore own >24.9% of a bank
- Carl Webb has been with Ford since its inception, investing alongside the Fund through several bank acquisitions and exits

#### **Aligned incentives**

- \$155mm of GP capital invested
- through sales
- years, realizing a ~47% gross IRR and ~3.8x gross MOIC

2010

**PACIFIC CAPITAL BANCORP** 

1994

**GOLDEN STATE BANCORP** 

1988

**FIRST GIBRALTAR** 

1975

FIRST UNITED **BANK** 

Distressed bank with low capital levels

\$500mm cash investment for 91% ownership

One of largest banks in California at the time

Merged California Federal into Golden State through a reverse stock merger

Private thrift focused on acquiring distressed banks

Became the fourth largest financial institution in Texas and Oklahoma

Became serial acquiror with 19 commercial banks in New Mexico / Texas

Accumulated \$3.8bn in total assets

- History of successful exits, including
- Invested ~\$1.6bn of equity over 45

\$1,500mm

Sold to Union BanCal SOLD \$5,800mm

> Sold to Citigroup

\$458mm<sup>1</sup>

Sold to BoA / Chase Manhattan

SOLD \$494mm

Sold to Northwest Corp

Source: Company materials; 1 Represents total gains from divestitures of the bank in 1992–1993; including to Bank of America / Chase Manhattan



# Mechanics Bank is Ford's fifth banking platform

#### **Acquisitions since Ford purchase of Mechanics**

2015

Mechanics

REPUBLIC

Ford acquires Mechanics

Approval<sup>1</sup>: 6 mo.

2016

Approval1: 4 mo.

Scott Valley, Bank

Entry into Orange, Expansion in Los Angeles and Northern California San Diego market counties

Approval1: 2 mo.

2018

2019



Rabobank

Expanded Mechanics by 100+ branches

Approval<sup>1</sup>: 3 mo.

#### Long-tenured, high-quality deposit franchises

Founded: 1905

■ Completed: April 2015

Mechanics

Deal value: \$520mm

Acquired 69% via tender offer to enter California again, this time via high-quality East Bay markets with an attractive. low-cost deposit franchise

**■ Founded:** 2007


CALIFORNIA REPUBLIC

■ Completed: September 2016

Deal value: \$330mm

High-growth commercial bank that expanded Mechanics' presence in Southern California: Mechanics drove profitability by using its excess liquidity to fund existing auto loans

#### **Total Assets since 2015**



Founded: 1858

■ Completed: June 2018

Deal value: \$123mm

Top-tier deposit franchise with deep ties to local community that established Mechanics' presence in Northern California

Founded: 1961<sup>2</sup>

Rabobank

■ Completed: August 2019

Deal value: \$1,530mm

Meaningful expansion of branch network across Central Coast through excellent low-cost deposit base; Mechanics carved out ag lending to create significant liquidity

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; 1 Timelines represent filing to approval dates; 2 Mid-State Bank & Trust founding, one of several high-quality deposit franchises acquired by Rabobank; <sup>3</sup> Represents total assets at close as projected per Mechanics management

# **Mechanics Bank – a high-performing bank**

#### **Standalone Mechanics Overview**

\$16.5bn Total assets 112 Branches #3
CA market share
by deposits<sup>2</sup>

#### Key stats vs. KRX1 mid-cap banking index

#### As of Q4'24

CoD: **1.38%** KRX<sup>1</sup>: 2.19% #5 of 51

L/D: **69%** KRX<sup>1</sup>: 85% #8 of 51 NIB: **40%** KRX<sup>1</sup>: 25%

(RX1: 25% #2 of 51


ROATCE: **15.2%** KRX<sup>1</sup>: 13.0% #13 of 51 Eff. ratio: 55%

KRX<sup>1</sup>: 57% #20 of 51

CET1: **16.1%** KRX<sup>1</sup>: 12.3%

#7 of 51

#### **Deposits** Loans In runoff Noninterest-L Auto Time bearing **CRE** MMDA & 17% savings 21% Cons. / Other 40% \$9.6bn \$13.9bn 42% 24% 1-4 Family Multifamily Interest-bearing demand



Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; <sup>1</sup> Represents the Nasdaq Regional Banking Index; <sup>2</sup> Includes banks headquartered in California with less than \$250bn in total assets



## Top decile deposit franchise

#### Key takeaways

- One of the most attractive, high-quality deposit franchises in the U.S.
- Average deposit account size of \$43k and an average account tenure of nearly 20 years
- Highly diversified deposit book (48% consumer, 43% commercial, 9% public)
- Core deposits have increased by **\$0.6 billion** (or 5%) since Rabobank deal
- No brokered deposits, wholesale funding or borrowings
- Consistently ranks in the top decile nationally<sup>2</sup> on overall cost of deposits and non-interest-bearing deposits (%) – #19 and #6 out of 217, respectively
- Cumulative deposit beta meaningfully below the top quartile of KRX banks

#### Deposit breakdown since Rabobank acquisition \$bn USD Core deposits Non-core deposits Cost of deposits Branches 144 130 8/31/2019: 115 115 112 112 Acquisition **(22%)** closes 1.38% \$16.8 \$16.3 \$15.5 \$14.3 \$14.7 \$14.6 \$13.9 0.7 44 1.4 1.1 13.5 13.3 0.25% 15.5 16.8 15.7 \$4.7 14.3 13.9 0.1 4.6 Pre-Post-Q4'19 Q4'20 Q4'21 Q4'22 Q4'23 Q4'24 deal1 deal1

#### Deposit costs and non-interest-bearing balances



1.38%


Industry<sup>2</sup> Rank: 19 of 217

#### Percentage Non-Interest-Bearing Deposits (4Q'24)<sup>2</sup>



Industry<sup>2</sup> Rank: 6 of 217

#### Cost of deposits in current rate cycle



Source: FactSet, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; ¹ Pre-deal represents Q4¹18, post-deal represents Q3¹19; ² Includes U.S. publicly traded banks above ~\$700mm in total assets; ³ Represents the Nasdaq Regional Banking Index; ⁴ Represents change in cost of deposits as percentage of change in Fed Funds target from December 31, 2021 to September 17, 2024 (525 bps)

## Dual-pronged strategy: acquisitions and operational excellence



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#### PREMIER DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS:

Focus on leveraging Mechanics platform to acquire high-quality, core deposit institutions that provide low-cost funding



#### ADDRESSABLE CHALLENGES:

Opportunistic acquiror focused on companies with addressable issues that have attractive core deposit bases





Operational excellence

#### **DEEP-ROOTED COMMUNITY TIES:**

Community bank with 100+ year history, exceptional deposit tenure and longstanding ties in our local markets



# Ongoing digitization of our company creates seamless touchpoints with customers to drive efficient growth





#### **INTEGRATION EXPERTISE:**


Significant experience integrating bank acquisitions with an exceptional track record of success and efficiency



Exceptional funding enables focus on low-risk, high-quality assets that drive superior credit and create excess risk-based capital

# Mechanics' loan portfolio has delivered superior credit quality

Mechanics has had cumulative net recoveries of \$27.4mm since the Rabobank acquisition with only \$11.0mm of charge-offs / losses and \$38.4mm of recoveries / interest recapture




Source: FactSet, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; 1 Non-residential; 2 Includes owner occupied and non-owner occupied; 3 Excludes non-accrual auto loans



## Mechanics has granular, low-risk CRE with a multifamily focus

- √ Highly granular and well-diversified across both collateral types and the sub-markets of California
- ✓ Focus on multifamily lending, with an emphasis on Southern California (54% of total multifamily)
  - Average multifamily loan size of \$3.3 million
  - Average multifamily LTV¹ of 52%
  - Average multifamily DCR<sup>2</sup> of 1.65x
- ✓ Modest CRE concentrations in retail and office, both of which have run-off significantly due to "de-risking" of Rabobank since 2019
  - Average size of CRE retail and office loans are \$3.6 and \$2.1 million, respectively
  - Average CRE retail LTV¹ of 51% and DCR² of 1.83x; average CRE office LTV¹ of 52% and DCR² of 1.65x
- ✓ Total CRE remains ~\$4.8bn, with 58% in lower risk-profile multifamily loans
  - CRE concentration of 289%; 114% ex-multifamily as of December 31, 2024
  - Six CRE office loans totaling \$27 million in central business districts of San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento and Oakland


CRE trends: since Q3'19								
(\$ in millions)	2019Q3	2024Q4	CAGR					
Multifamily	\$1,124	\$2,799	18.9%					
Retail	1,282	688	(11.2%)					
Office	1,108	535	(12.9%)					
Industrial / warehouse	709	396	(10.5%)					
Special purpose	291	163	(10.4%)					
Hotel / motel	224	138	(8.8%)					
Mixed use	259	93	(17.7%)					
Total CRE	\$4,997	\$4,812	(0.7%)					



Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; <sup>1</sup> LTV defined as current loan balance divided by most recent appraisal; CRE LTV does not include multifamily; <sup>2</sup> DCRs based on most recent review (origination in instances where loan is below review threshold); CRE DCRs exclude owner-user loans




## Superior risk-adjusted returns with significant capital flexibility



Source: FactSet, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Projections per Mechanics management; Assumes Mechanics' excess capital above 8.6% leverage ratio is paid as dividends in 4Q'25 and moving forward; Financial data as of December 31, 2024; 2025E – 2027E numbers represent Mechanics standalone forecast; <sup>1</sup> Reflects core metrics, adjusting for \$149mm after-tax loss from securities repositioning; <sup>2</sup> Assumes dividends are paid in 2025







**Home**Street

# 3<sup>rd</sup> Largest West Coast and California bank by deposits


#### **Top West Coast Headquartered Banks by deposits**

Includes banks headquartered in California, Oregon and Washington with less than \$250bn total assets; California, Oregon and Washington deposits shown

### **EASTWEST** \$51.3 COLUMBIA \$39.5 \$18.9<sup>1</sup> \$18.1 Cathay \$15.9 \$15.8 WaFd PACIFIC PREMIER \$14.1 ANNER \$12.5 \$11.8 \$11.1

### **Top California Headquartered Banks by deposits**

Includes banks headquartered in California with less than \$250bn total assets; California deposits shown



### Significant scarcity value in desirable West Coast and California markets

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Deposit data as of June 30, 2024; ¹ Pro forma for HomeStreet acquisition; deposit totals are reduced by the paydown of \$751mm of HomeStreet brokered deposits in Washington and \$249mm of HomeStreet other high-cost deposits; Transaction expected to include additional \$1bn run-off of high-cost CDs following closing; not accounted for in the above deposits




# **Top 10 share in many West Coast markets**

Top pro forma ma	rkets		
Top 10 10–20		De	eposits (\$bn)   Rank
>20		[H]	<b>⊗</b> /[н]
Seattle		\$4.0   #8	\$4.0   #8
San Francisco	\$3.9   #10		\$3.9   #10
Los Angeles	\$1.2   #38	\$0.7   #51	\$1.9   #33
San Luis Obispo	\$1.4   #2		\$1.4   #2
Santa Barbara	\$1.1   #6		\$1.1   #6
Salinas	\$1.1   #4		\$1.1   #4
Oxnard	\$0.9   #6		\$0.9   #6
Riverside	\$0.4   #19	\$0.4   #20	\$0.8   #15
El Centro	\$0.6   #1		\$0.6   #1
Honolulu		\$0.6   #7	\$0.6   #7
Sacramento	\$0.5   #16		\$0.5   #16
Chico	\$0.4   #8		\$0.4   #8
Bakersfield	\$0.4   #9		\$0.4   #9
Siskiyou county	\$0.3   #1		\$0.3   #1
Portland		\$0.3   #16	\$0.3   #16

Source: Public Policy Institute of California; S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Branch and deposit data as of June 30, 2024; 1 Represents current median household income; excludes District of Columbia




# HomeStreet's high growth was supported with expensive funding . . .



Source: Company filings; S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; <sup>1</sup> Represents total deposits excluding time deposits



# ... resulting in a bifurcated deposit base with attractive core funding that is in line with Mechanics' acquisition strategy




Source: Company filings, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024

<sup>1</sup> Based on bank level regulatory reporting, excluding the impacts of purchase accounting adjustments; 2 Represents total deposits excluding time deposits; 3 Securities yield is FTE at cost basis




# Mechanics' capital and liquidity provide capacity to mark assets, paydown expensive wholesale funding and add high quality deposits



Source: Company filings, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; 1 Assumes paydown of all brokered deposits and other high-cost CDs; 2 Assuming 8.0% Tier 1 leverage




# Combined company will use low-beta, high-quality deposits to fund low-risk, duration-matched loans . . .



Source: Company filings, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; Pro forma portfolios assume the paydown of \$751mm of brokered deposits and \$249mm of other high-cost deposits at close; Pro forma loan portfolio excludes the impacts of purchase accounting; 1 Reflects metrics at close




## ... creating a highly profitable combined institution



Source: Mechanics' management projections; see Appendix for further detail; <sup>1</sup> Includes loan, deposit and borrowings marks, impacts of balance sheet repositioning, non-PCD double-count, AOCI accretion, amortization of CDIs, HomeStreet amortization expense, statutory tax rate adjustment, lost spread from CD outflows post close and repricing of CDs; <sup>2</sup> Reverses impact of CDI amortization




## Combined company is the most profitable among West Coast banks<sup>1</sup>...



Source: FactSet, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; Market data as of March 28, 2025; West coast banks include BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK and WAFD; PIUIly-synergized operating figure excludes one-time charges, based on Mechanics' management projections



## ... with a low-risk, well-capitalized, core funded balance sheet



Source: FactSet, S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; <sup>1</sup> Represents 2025Q4 projected data, assuming paydown of \$751mm of brokered deposits and \$249mm of other high-cost deposits at close; <sup>2</sup> Represents the CET1 ratio at close



# Pro forma franchise has increased scale, less risk and top decile profitability . . .

		[HomeStreet]	→   Mechanics / [H]
	Total assets	\$8.1bn	\$23bn 🕜
Monte	Deposit rank in West coast market <sup>1</sup>	14	3
Mark	Deposit rank in California <sup>1</sup>	-	3
	Branches	56	168
	Ownership	100.0%	8.3%
	Netincome	\$20mm	\$302mm²
Profi	HomeStreet net income	\$20mm	\$25mm 🕜
(2026	ROAA	0.25%	1.4%² <b>#1</b> ⁴
(2020	ROATCE	4.2%	18%² # <b>1⁴</b>
	NIM	2.1%	3.9%² <b>#1</b> ⁴
	Efficiency ratio	88%	49%² <b>У</b>
	CET1	8.6%	12.4%
	Tier 1 leverage	5.8%	8.3%
Balar	<b>nce</b> Total capital	12.2%	14.4%
shee	t CRE concentration	575%³	390%
	Loans / deposits	97%	78%
	Cash + securities / assets	18%	25%
	Cost of funds	3.27%	~1.4%5 🗸
Fund	FHLB + brokered deposits / assets	22%	0% <b>#1</b> 4
Fund	% Noninterest-bearing deposits	19%	35%
	CDs / deposits	51%	17%

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, FactSet; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; Market data as of March 28, 2025; Check mark indicates improvement versus HomeStreet standalone; ¹ West Coast includes banks headquartered in California, Oregon and Washington with less than \$250bn of assets; California includes banks headquartered in California with less than \$250bn of assets; ² Fully-synergized operating figure, based on Mechanics' management projections; ³ Represents commercial real estate loans as a percentage of total risk-based capital (HoldCo level); ⁴ Relative to West Coast banks, including BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK and WAFD ⁵ Represents 2025Q4 projected data; Includes run-off of \$1.0bn of high-cost CDs and adjusts for repricing of CDs



# ... and is financially compelling to existing shareholders

Highly accretive to earnings

\$1.31

~**23%**2026F FPS accretion<sup>1</sup>

**230bps+**Annual CET1 generation<sup>2</sup>

Low-risk, wellcapitalized, core funded balance sheet

12.4%

**8.3%**Tier 1 leverage

**0%**Wholesale funded
(no brokered deposits
and FHLB)

Top tier deposit franchise

**3rd**Largest West Coast and California franchise by deposits<sup>3</sup>

**35%**Non-interest bearing

~1.4% 4Q'25E cost of funds

<sup>1</sup> Fully synergized based on HomeStreet consensus estimates; 2 Organic CET1 generation before dividends; 3 Includes banks headquartered in California, Oregon, and Washington with less than \$250bn in assets





**Home**Street

# Combined company is expected to materially outperform most West Coast and high-multiple national banks

					West co	ast banks²	High-multiple banks³
		Estimated pro forma (2026E)1	Better than West coast banks?	Better than high-multiple banks?	Median⁴	Top quartile⁴	Median⁴
	Net interest margin	3.9%	#1	#1	3.44%	3.57%	3.49%
Profitability (2026E)	ROAA	1.4%	#1	<b>√</b>	0.98%	1.14%	1.30%
	ROATCE	18%	#1	<b>√</b>	11.9%	13.1%	14.5%
	Cost of funds	~1.4%5	✓	<b>√</b>	1.71%	1.61%	1.66%
Funding (Q4'24)	Loans / deposits	78%	<b>√</b>	~	83%	72%	71%
	Wholesale / total funding	0%	#1	#1	4%	2%	1%
Capital return (2026E)	Target dividend payout	>90%	#1	#1	47%	59%	44%

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; Market data as of March 28, 2025; Check mark indicates metric is better than respective West coast or high-multiple bank median; Tilde indicates metric is in-line with respective West coast or high-multiple bank median; Net interest margin, ROAA and ROATCE represent fully-synergized operating figures, as per Mechanics management; West coast banks include BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK, and WAFD; Includes BOH, CBSH, CBU, FFIN, FHB, GBCI and UBSI; Based on consensus estimates for 2026E profitability and capital return; Represents 2025Q4 projected data; includes run-off of \$1.0bn of high-cost CDs and adjusts for repricing of CDs; Assumes a target of \$300mm of dividends



# Combined company positioned for upside

				,	West coast banks	1	High-multiple banks <sup>2</sup>
			Metric	Median	Top quartile	Long-term median⁴	Median
		Price / Pro forma '26E EPS³	\$1.31	11.1x	12.4x	12.9x	14.4x
	Implied	HomeStreet share price⁵	Current share price \$9.30	\$14.55	\$16.23	\$16.80	\$18.79
	Memo: potential upside  Implied pro forma P/TBV	Memo: potential upside	Pro forma	Potential upside	75%	81%	102%
		Implied pro forma P/TBV		1.94x	2.16x	2.24x	2.50x

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; Market data as of March 28, 2025; <sup>1</sup> West coast banks include BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK, and WAFD; <sup>2</sup> Includes BOH, CBSH, CBU, FFIN, FHB, GBCI and UBSI; <sup>3</sup> Fully synergized 2026E operating EPS based on Mechanics' management projections; Consensus 2026E multiples shown for west coast and high multiple banks <sup>4</sup> Represents 5-year median of West Coast banks; <sup>5</sup> Represents 2026E pro forma EPS multiplied by indicative P/E ratio




## Illustrative value creation to HomeStreet shareholders

	2026E P/E							
\$mm	10.0x	11.0x	12.0x	13.0x	14.0x	15.0x	16.0x	17.0x
2026E pro forma net income¹	\$302	\$302	\$302	\$302	\$302	\$302	\$302	\$302
Value of pro forma company²	\$3,020	\$3,322	\$3,624	\$3,926	\$4,228	\$4,530	\$4,832	\$5,134
Dividend yield³	9.9%	9.0%	8.3%	7.6%	7.1%	6.6%	6.2%	5.8%
Value attributable to HomeStreet (8.3%)	\$252	\$277	\$302	\$327	\$352	\$378	\$403	\$428
Value creation to HomeStreet shareholders⁴	\$72	\$97	\$122	\$148	\$173	\$198	\$223	\$248
Implied P/TBV	1.73x	1.91x	2.08x	2.25x	2.43x	2.60x	2.78x	2.95x
Value creation (%) to HomeStreet⁴	40%	54%	68%	82%	96%	110%	124%	138%

Note: ¹ Fully synergized operating figure based on Mechanics' management projections; ² Represents 2026E pro forma net income multiplied by indicative P/E ratio; ³ Assumes a target of \$300mm of dividends ⁴ Relative to HomeStreet market cap of \$180mm as of March 28, 2025



# West Coast banks<sup>1</sup>: Forward ROATCE vs P/TBV regression



Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; Market data as of March 28, 2025; <sup>1</sup> West coast banks include BANC, BANR, BOH, CVBF, FHB, FIBK, GBCI, HFWA, HTBK, PPBI, TCBK and WAFD; <sup>2</sup> Fully-synergized operating figure, based on Mechanics' management projections



# **Future Mechanics Bank strategy**

## Opportunistic M&A paired with the operational excellence of a talented management team

- **✓** Efficiently integrate HomeStreet acquisition, including carefully planned core systems conversion in Q1 2026
- ✓ Continued prudence with mortgage and commercial real estate lending
  - 1. Primarily a balance sheet lender (substantially reduce gain-on-sale)
  - 2. Decreased CRE concentration over time
  - 3. Explore strategic options to maximize value of multifamily DUS business
- ✓ Continued runoff and likely sale of the remaining auto book post-closing
- **✓** Maintain single family construction lending of HomeStreet within Mechanics Bank underwriting guidelines
- **✓** Continue to invest in high-growth Wealth Management division
- **✓** Profitably grow core deposits across retail and commercial channels
- ✓ Continue to invest in technology across the enterprise





**Home**Street

## **Extensive due diligence conducted on HomeStreet**

51%

% of commercial loans<sup>4</sup> reviewed by Mechanics

\$2.4bn

Commercial loan balances reviewed by Mechanics

2

Due diligence processes completed by Mechanics (2024, 2025) Mechanics' third-party advisors

J.P. Morgan, Wachtell, KPMG

#### Key themes:

#### Diligence focus areas included:

Overview of diligence

- Mechanics and HomeStreet have completed two independent diligence processes while exploring potential acquisitions in both early 2024 and 2025
- Mobilized entire team, including executives from credit, finance, HR, operations, IT and compliance to analyze all aspects of HomeStreet
- Mechanics engaged external advisors including J.P. Morgan<sup>1</sup>, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz<sup>2</sup> and KPMG<sup>3</sup>

**Key findings** 

- Reviewed commercial loans with outstanding balances totaling \$2.4bn, representing 51% of commercial balances
- 94% of criticized loans (Special Mention and worse) were reviewed, with remainder passed on due to small balance size
- HomeStreet has a highly attractive core deposit base that complements Mechanics Bank's
- Meaningful expense-based synergy opportunities

Experienced M&A history

- Leading integrations in bank M&A in California since 1994
- Highly confident in a successful and efficient integration

**Credit and Underwriting** 

**Finance and Accounting** 

**Funding and Liquidity** 

Regulatory

**Risk Management** 

Legal

**Human Resources** 

**Commercial Real Estate** 

**Branch Strategy** 

Compliance

Information Technology

**Operations** 

<sup>1</sup> Financial advisory; 2 Legal and regulatory; 3 Quality of earnings, loan level cash flows, interest rate sensitivities, valuation, HR, tax, IT and single / multifamily lending; 4 Based on loan balances of HomeStreet



# **Key financial assumptions**

Earnings	<ul> <li>Mechanics: Management forecast through 2027, as reflected on slide 16</li> <li>HomeStreet: Consensus estimates for 2026; Mechanics management forecast in 2027</li> </ul>
Cost synergies	<ul> <li>\$82mm pre-tax (42% of HMST 2024 reported non-interest expense)</li> <li>32% phase-in in Q4'25; 55% phase-in in Q1'26; 90% phase-in in Q2'26; 100% phase-in thereafter</li> </ul>
Restructuring charge	\$115mm pre-tax – phased in over the first five quarters after close, with \$85mm pre-tax (\$69mm after-tax) incurred at close
Core deposit intangibles	\$92mm CDI created; 3.3% of non-time deposits at close¹; amortized over 10 years using sum-of-the-years'-digits
Credit mark / CECL impacts	<ul> <li>2.29x HomeStreet loan loss reserve at close (\$85mm)</li> <li>\$55mm of PCD credit mark (provisioned into ACL)</li> <li>\$30mm of non-PCD discount accreted into earnings</li> <li>\$30mm Day 2 credit mark (provisioned into ACL)</li> <li>Total loss absorption capacity of \$115mm (1.92% of loans)²</li> </ul>
Purchase accounting (Pre-tax)	<ul> <li>AOCI, rolled forward to close: (\$71mm), accreted over remaining life of securities</li> <li>Loans at close: (\$200mm⁴), accreted over remaining life of loans</li> <li>Deferred origination costs on loans: (\$22mm)</li> <li>Fixed assets: (\$6mm)</li> <li>OREO: (\$1mm)</li> <li>Unfunded loan loss liability: (\$4mm)</li> <li>Deposits: None</li> <li>Debt: \$40mm, amortized over remaining life of debt³</li> <li>Reversal of HomeStreet Q4'24 DTA valuation allowance: \$48mm</li> </ul>
Balance sheet restructuring	<ul> <li>Assumes Mechanics sells ~\$1.25bn of AFS securities and utilizes the combined company's excess liquidity</li> <li>Paydown of costly HomeStreet funding: (~\$1,000mm of FHLB, ~\$249mm of high-cost deposits)</li> <li>Paydown of brokered deposits: ~\$751mm</li> </ul>
Additional assumptions	<ul> <li>Mechanics standalone tax rate: 29.5%</li> <li>Purchase accounting &amp; pro forma tax rate: 27.3%</li> </ul>

Source: Company filings; FactSet; S&P Global Market Intelligence; Note: Market data as of March 28, 2025; Financial data as of December 31, 2024

<sup>1</sup> Excludes \$249mm of high-cost CDs paid down at close; <sup>2</sup> Includes \$85mm allowance on acquired loans and \$30mm net credit discount on acquired non-PCD loans; <sup>3</sup> Includes \$2mm senior debt; \$23mm subordinated debt; \$14mm trust preferred debt; <sup>4</sup> Assumes net loan mark is rolled forward to close (\$250mm interest rate mark excluding loan roll-off)



# **Purchase accounting summary**

Tangible book value per basic share							
\$mm	\$mm	mm shares	mm \$ per share				
HomeStreet							
HomeStreet tangible book value as of Dec. 31, 2024	\$390	18.9	\$20.60				
Three quarters of earnings, AOCI accretion and intangible amort.	16						
Standalone HomeStreet TBVPS at close	\$406	18.9	\$21.44				
<u>Pro forma</u>							
Standalone HomeStreet tangible book value at close	\$406	18.9					
Standalone Mechanics tangible book value at close <sup>1</sup>	1,573						
Reversal of HomeStreet equity and intangibles	(406)						
Merger consideration for accounting purposes	300	212.3					
CDI and writeup of DUS license	(107)						
Bargain purchase gain	61						
After-tax restructuring charge	(68)						
After-tax CECL double count	(22)						
Pro forma tangible book value at close	\$1,737	231.2	\$7.51				

### Bargain purchase gain calculation

	\$mm
Fixed exchange ratio	3301.1x
Mechanics contribution	3,300
Mechanics shares outstanding	0.06
Contribution of Mechanics per share	\$51,270
HomeStreet diluted shares	19.3
Reciprocal exchange ratio	0.0003x
Merger consideration for accounting purposes	\$300
Standalone HomeStreet TBV at close	\$406
Reversal of DTA valuation allowance	48
After-tax net credit mark	(35)
After-tax amortized loan discount	(16)
After-tax loan mark	(145)
After-tax fixed asset mark	(4)
After-tax OREO mark	(1)
After-tax unfunded loan liability	(3)
After-tax borrowings mark <sup>2</sup>	28
Adjusted HomeStreet TBV at close	\$278
Excess over adjusted tangible book value	\$22
(–) Core deposit intangible created	92
(+) DTL on CDI	24
(-) Writeup of DUS license	15
Goodwill created / (bargain purchase gain)	(\$61)

### Bargain purchase gain of \$61mm

Note: <sup>1</sup> Mechanics standalone tangible book value per share includes 4Q'24 TBV as well as three quarters of net income, AOCI accretion and intangible amortization; <sup>2</sup> Includes \$2mm (pre-tax) senior debt; \$23mm (pre-tax) subordinated debt; \$14mm (pre-tax) trust preferred debt



# Purchase accounting summary (cont'd)

### **Earnings per share accretion**

\$mm, except per share values	2026E
HomeStreet consensus standalone net income	\$20
Mechanics standalone net income	205
Combined net income	\$225
Cost synergies	59
HomeStreet existing amortization expense	1
Accretion / (amortization) of loan mark	45
Accretion / (amortization) of debt mark	(5)
Amortization of CDIs (after-tax)	(12)
Accretion of non-PCD double count	7
Accretion / (amortization) of AOCI	9
Balance sheet restructuring	7
Reduction in fee income / Durbin / other earnings adjustments	(34)
Pro forma net income (fully synergized)	\$302
HomeStreet diluted shares outstanding	19.3
Shares issued to Mechanics shareholders	212.5
Pro forma average diluted shares outstanding	231.7
HomeStreet (fully synergized)	
Pro forma EPS	\$1.31
Standalone EPS	1.06
Accretion / (dilution) (%)	23%

Source: Mechanics' management projections



# **Details on Mechanics Bank standalone CRE portfolio**

### CRE by collateral (\$mm)

Collateral type	Balance	% of Owner-occupied	LTV <sup>1</sup>	Avg size	Total classified	Non-owner classified	Owner classified
Multifamily	\$2,799	0%	52%	\$3.3	\$1.3	\$1.3	\$0.0
Retail	688	3%	51%	3.6	9.1	7.7	1.4
Office	535	18%	52%	2.1	19.7	19.7	0.0
Industrial / w arehouse	396	35%	43%	1.8	1.2	0.0	1.2
Other	163	52%	49%	2.0	7.3	0.0	7.3
Hotel / motel	138	1%	52%	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mixed use	93	22%	44%	1.2	0.2	0.0	0.2
Total	\$4,812	10%	49%	\$2.8	\$38.8	\$28.7	\$10.1

### **CRE** by collateral and origination (\$mm)

Collateral type	Balance	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019 or earlier
Multifamily	\$2,799	7%	14%	28%	25%	14%	14%
Retail	688	1%	1%	18%	4%	1%	75%
Office	535	1%	2%	22%	5%	7%	62%
Industrial / w arehouse	396	4%	4%	28%	11%	5%	48%
Other	163	0%	7%	27%	8%	0%	57%
Hotel / motel	138	0%	10%	16%	22%	0%	52%
Mixed use	93	2%	2%	13%	0%	6%	77%
Total	\$4,812	4%	9%	25%	17%	9%	34%

Source: Mechanics management; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; 1 LTV defined as current loan balance divided by most recent appraisal



# Details on Mechanics Bank standalone CRE portfolio (cont'd)

## CRE by collateral and reset / maturity (\$mm)

Collateral type	Balance	Balance maturing next 24 months	Rate resets next 24 months	Maturity & rate reset % of loans
Multifamily	\$2,799	\$56	\$45	4%
Retail	688	354	0	52%
Office	535	184	1	35%
Industrial / w arehouse	396	63	12	19%
Other	163	41	9	30%
Hotel / motel	138	54	4	42%
Mixed use	93	26	4	31%
Total	\$4,812	\$777	\$76	18%

### CRE by loan size and collateral (\$mm)

Loan size	Multifamily	Retail	Office	Industrial	Other	Hotel / motel	Mixed use	Total
Greater than \$20mm	\$61	\$45	\$49	\$0	\$43	\$20	\$0	\$217
\$10mm-\$20mm	631	186	152	73	12	47	10	1,111
\$5mm_\$10mm	706	237	119	83	29	42	19	1,235
\$1mm-\$5mm	1,307	190	164	194	60	27	44	1,986
Less than \$1mm	93	30	52	46	20	2	21	264
Total	\$2,799	\$688	\$535	\$396	\$163	\$138	\$93	\$4,812
Count	846	190	252	226	80	28	78	1,700
Average size	\$3.3	\$3.6	\$2.1	\$1.8	\$2.0	\$4.9	\$1.2	\$2.8

Source: Mechanics management; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024



# Pro forma deposit overview

Mechanics						
Segment	Number of accounts	Deposit balance (\$bn)	Deposit balance (%)	Average account size	Weighted age (yrs)	Cost <sup>1</sup>
Consumer	268,152	\$6.7	48%	\$25,017	20.6	1.17%
Business	54,261	6.0	43%	111,214	16.9	1.06%
Public	1,133	1.2	9%	1,058,152	27.3	3.04%
Servicing	_	-	_	-	-	-
Brokered	_	-	_	-	_	-
Total	323,546	\$13.9	100%	\$43,091	19.6	1.28%

Segment	Number of accounts	Deposit balance (\$bn)	Deposit balance (%)	Average account size	Weighted age (yrs)	Cost <sup>1</sup>
Consumer	122,717	\$3.6	56%	\$29,125	8.9	2.89%
Business	18,587	1.7	26%	89,186	11.3	1.18%
Public	153	0.3	5%	2,196,944	5.7	4.18%
Servicing	106	0.1	1%	902,560	36.6	-
Brokered	5	0.7	12%	149,881,800	0.2	4.61%
Total	141,568	\$6.4	100%	\$45,300	8.7	2.68%
Total (adj.) <sup>2</sup>	126,660	\$4.4	100%	\$34,870	10.9	1.74%

**HomeStreet** 

Pro forma Mechanics (adjusted) <sup>2</sup>							
Segment	Number of accounts	Deposit balance (\$bn)	Deposit balance (%)	Average account size	Weighted age (yrs)	Cost <sup>1</sup>	
Consumer	376,684	\$9.4	51%	\$24,894	17.5	1.46%	
Business	72,143	7.6	41%	105,350	15.9	1.04%	
Public	1,273	1.3	7%	1,007,771	25.6	3.05%	
Servicing	106	0.1	1%	902,560	36.6	-	
Brokered	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	450,206	\$18.4	100%	\$40,773	17.5	1.39%	

Source: Mechanics management; Note: Financial data as of December 31, 2024; <sup>1</sup> Represents spot rate as of December 31, 2024; <sup>2</sup> Assumes runoff of \$1bn of high-cost CDs, paydown of all brokered deposits and \$249mm of additional high-cost deposits at HomeStreet

